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Abstract 
Short-time work is a principal form of flexible workforce adjustment in which 
declines in labour demand are compensated by temporary reductions in 
working time as an alternative to dismissals. Although enterprises may elect 
such a strategy even in the absence of a programme, public short-time work 
schemes provide a strong additional incentive. Most European countries have 
explicit schemes to promote this form of work sharing. 
This paper compares short-time work programs and patterns and trends in 
short time working in France, Germany and Italy. The goals of the short-time 
work schemes in the three countries examined are broadly similar: to stabilize 
employment and to avoid or minimize dismissals during temporary economic 
downturns through reductions in working time and to assist firms in economic 
difficulty. Although France, Germany and Italy all have short-time work 
schemes, both the level and pattern of use of short-time working differ, in some 
cases markedly. 
This paper examines incentives for work sharing, patterns of uptake of 
short-time work, and the use of short-time work for structural intervention in 
France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Chapter 1 discusses various factors 
influencing the use of short-time work in labour force adjustment. The following 
chapters compare the characteristics of short-time work schemes (2); analyze 
similarities and differences in the level and structure of short-time work (3); and 
examine recent experience with short-time work as an instrument of structural 
adjustment,(4). The principal conclusions are summarized in Chapter 5.. 
Analysis of estimated full-time equivalents shows the highest incidence of 
short-time work in Italy and Spain, followed by Germany and France. This 
pattern is the product not only of the relative generosity of short-time schemes 
but of a variety of other institutional factors such as employment protection, 
flexibility options, and labour representation. Short-time work is highly 
concentrated in industry and disproportionately in larger enterprises in all four 
countries. This pattern of uptake is not a consequence of restrictions on 
eligibility in short-time programme regulations but is rooted in differences 
between industry and the service sector and between large and small firms in 
markets and adjustment style. 
Originally introduced with the goal of maintaining employment in 
enterprises experiencing temporary difficulties, short-time work is increasingly 
used as an accompanying measure in enterprises undergoing structural 
change. This use of the instrument is strongest in Italy and Spain but has also 
been widely practiced in Germany since the mid-1970s. While temporary or 
cyclical use represents an efficient co-ordination mechanism of labour market 
policy, prolonged use of short-time work in structural adjustment is 
problematical. The same goals could be better achieved through other labour 
market measures. 
Zusammenfassung 
Kurzarbeit als Form flexibler Arbeitskrafteanpassung zielt darauf, durch einebe-
fristete VerkOrzung der Arbeitszeit als Alternative zu Entlassungen einen 
ROckgang der Nachfrage nach Arbeitskraften zu kompensieren. Offentliche 
(geforderte) Kurzarbeits-Programme stellen fur Untemehmen bei der Wahl 
einer solchen Strategie einen hohen zusatzlichen Anreiz dar. Sie existieren in 
den meisten Mitgliedstaaten der Europaischen Union. 
Diese Studie untersucht sowohl die Anreize fur „worksharing", der Umver-
teilung eines geschrumpften Arbeitsvolumens auf die gleiche Anzahl von Mit-
arbeitem/innen, als auch die Muster von Kur -zarbeit und deren Einsatz für 
strukturelle Interventionen. Sie vergleicht den Einsatz dieser arbeitsmarktpoliti-
schen Instrumente in Frankreich, Deutschland, Oalien und Spanien. 
In Kapitel ems werden die Determinanten und Anreize ft -1r den Einsatz von 
„worksharing" als Arbeitskrafteanpassung diskutiert. Kapitel zwei charakteri-
siert und vergleicht die Auspragungen von Kurzarbeitsprogrammen. Kapitel 
drei analysiert den Einsatz von Kurzarbeit auf der Basis nationaler Programm-
daten im Hinblick auf Unterschiede und Gemeinsamkeiten. Kapitel vier unter-
sucht jOngste Erfahrungen beim Einsatz von Kurzarbeit als arbeitsmarktpoliti-
sches Instrument im Strukturwandel. Kapitel funf fat die grundlegenden 
SchluBfolgerungen zusammen. 
Die Analyse der geschatzten Vollzeitaguivalente von Kurzarbeit zeigt den 
hOchsten Einsatz von Kurzarbeit in Italien und Spanien, gefolgt von Deutsch-
land und Frankreich. Diese unterschiedliche lnanspruchnahme der Programme 
hangt nicht nur von der jeweiligen Ausgestaltung ab, sondem wird zusatzlich in 
starkem MaBe vom jeweiligen institutionellen Kontext beeinfluBt: So spielen 
neben der Starke des KOndigungsschutzes z.B. auch das Arbeitslosen-
versicherungssystem, das System der industriellen Beziehungen und Arbeits-
zeitvorschriften eine wesentliche Rolle. 
Kutzarbeit konzentriert sich in alien vier Landem auf den industriellen 
Sektor und auf groBe Unternehmen. Dies erklart sich weniger durch die Pro-
gramme selbst, sondem wurzelt in komplexen Unterschieden von Markten und 
Anpassungsstilen. UrsprOnglich als eine beschaftigungssichernde MaBnahme 
fur Untemehmen mit zeitweiligen PersonalOberhang aufgrund einer Rezes-
sion eingefuhrt, wird Kurz.arbeit heute zunehmend auch als innerbetriebliche 
Flexibilisierungsmeglichkeit zur Bewaltigung des strukturellen Wandels ge-
nutzt. In dieser Art wird Kurzarbeit vor allem in ltalien und Spanien eingesetzt, 
in Deutschland geschieht dies seit Mitte der siebziger Jahre. 
Der temporare oder zyklische Einsatz von Kurzarbeit stellt einen effizienten 
Koordinationsmechanismus der Arbeitsmarktpolitik dar. Ihr langerfristiger Ein-
satz dagegen als Instrument zur strukturellen Anpassung 1st als problematisch 
anzusehen. Diese Ziele k6nnen durch andere Mal3nahmen besser erreicht 
werden. 
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Flexible Adjustment through Short-time Work: A Comparison of 
France, Germany, Italy, and Spain+ 
1. Short-time Work in Labour Force Adjustment 
Short-time work enables management to quickly adjust labour inputs and costs 
to changed business conditions by reducing working time for the existing 
workforce rather than resorting to forced redundancies. This form of work 
sharing, i.e., a temporaty reduction is working time to avoid dismissals, is, 
however, only one strategy among many that firms may pursue in adjusting 
their labour force; whether firms make use of it depends on regulatory and 
institutional factors that determine its relative attractiveness. 
The principal determinants of utilization of short-time work in a given 
national setting can be summarized in a simple model (Figure 1). They are: I) 
The type and magnitude of changes in the economic environment that give rise 
to the adjustment situation; II) The characteristics of short-time work 
programmes themselves; Ill) The labour market regulatory framework; IV) The 
industrial relations environment; V) Firm characteristics. As the model 
suggests, the incentives for employers and employees to utilize short-time work 
are strongly dependent not only on economic conditions but on the 
characteristics of national short-time work schemes, the institutional context, 
and the availability of functional equivalents. 
I. Economic circumstances. The most important determinant of short-time 
work is fluctuation in economic output short-time work is an adjustment 
strategy for- periods of economic downturn The incentives for the utilization of 
Short-time work for employers differ depending on whether a temporary or 
permanent decline in labour demand is anticipated. In the former case it allows 
employers to retain qualified and experienced workers and avoid firing and 
subsequent hiring costs, especially during cyclical downtums. 2 
1 	 Roberto Goldin conducted field interviews in Italy and drafted an Italian case study (Goldin 
1995), on which this report is based. The authors would like to thank SiIke Bothfeld and 
Robyn VViesener for their assistance throughout the project. 
2 	 Recruitment costs are higher for more skilled personnel and training costs higher for 
workers with firm-specific qualifications, which are not readily available on the external 
labour market. In tight labour markets the incentives for labour hoarding are 
correspondingly greater. 
1 
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In the case of a permanent decline in labour requirements the incentives for 
employers to resort to work sharing are less evident Rehiring costs will no 
longer play any role and termination costs must be incurred in any case for 
firms experiencing structural decline. Moreover, the extended use of short-time 
work may entail opportunity costs for firms by prolonging the restructuring 
process. 
One possible incentive for firms is that short-time work may reduce 
termination costs by stretching the workforce reductions over a longer period, 
thus, allowing more time for natural fluctuation (retirements, quits etc.). 3 
Employment protection regulations in many countries may even require that 
firms make use of short-time work as well as other soft modes of adjustment 
before resorting to redundancies. 
II. Short-time work programmes. Since short-time work is only one option for 
employers in adjustment situations, its attractiveness depends on the existence 
of a public scheme and the actual reduction in labour costs realized by 
employers through use of the scheme. Although enterprises may elect such a 
strategy even in the absence of a public programme, public short-time work 
schemes provide a strong incentive for work sharing in adjustment situations. 
The short-time scheme subsidy depends inter alia on the duration of short-time 
benefits, the extent to which employers are required to share in the financing of 
short-time benefits •and their liability for social security contributions for 
employees on short time.4 
Most European countries have explicit schemes to promote temporary re-
ductions in working time as an alternative to lay-offs Normally employees on 
short-time receive a wage-replac,ement benefit for hours not worked, usually 
paid through the unemployment insurance system. Within the European Union 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain have special labour 
market programmes to promote temporary reductions in working time as an 
alternative to dismissals In other countries more limited assistance is available 
in the form of temporary lay-offs or partial benefits under unemployment 
insurance (Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, UK). 
Canada adopted a work sharing programme as an alternative to layoffs in the 
late 1970s as have a number of US states (e.g. California). 
Ill. Regulatory framework. The labour market regulatory framework is of 
particular importance in explaining the incentives for enterprises to utilize short- 
For example, short-time benefits may be used to reduce labour costs during mandatory 
notice periods. 
Features such as flexibility in application procedures or in the selection of personnel are 
also of importance (Vroman 1992). 
3 
time work. Among the principal institutional and regulatory factors are 1) 
employment protection regulations; (2) other flexibility options, especially 
the amount of flexibility permitted in varying working time in response to the 
firm's labour needs; and regulations pertaining to temporary or other forms of 
atypical employment, and temporary lay-offs. 
Employment protection limits external adjustment in the form of "hiring and 
firing" by imposing constraints and costs on terminations. Firing costs typically 
include the costs of notice periods, severance payments, early retirement 
provisions and other elements of the "social plans" which are customary or 
required in all EU-states. Statutory requirements are as a rule also augmented 
by collective agreements and the personnel policies of enterprises. The greater 
the constraints and costs imposed by employment protection on dismissals, the 
more attractive (or indispensable) is a short-time work for firms, which in effect 
relieves firms of part of their contractual liability for wages. The level of these 
costs are highly specific to the national institutional setting (Mosley 1994). 
Flexibility options. Although employment protection regulations impose 
constraints (and costs) on external adjustment (and hence an incentive for 
avoiding involuntary terminations), other aspects of the regulatory framework 
may provide alternatives to or functional equivalents for short-time work, 
enabling firms to combine flexibility in response to market contingencies with 
avoidance of excessive turnover costs: 5 
• Temporary layoffs. In some countries 'short-time' as a response to 
declines in labour demand may take the form of temporary layoffs financed 
through unemployment insurance with subsequent recall of the affected 
employees. This is particularly likely in countries with a low level of 
regulation of employment contracts (e.g. the US, UK and Ireland), in which 
the costs of redundancies to employers may be relatively low. 
• Flexible working time regimes enable enterprises to allocate contractual 
working time in response to temporary, seasonal, and - to a more limited 
extent - cyclical fluctuation in labour demand over a longer balancing period 
(typically up to a year) while minimizing resort to short-time work. 
• Overtime is relevant to patterns of downward adjustment since it may also 
be part of a lean personnel strategy over the business cycle in which 
overtime is preferred to new hires during periods of expansion as a buffer to 
minimize involuntary separations among the core workforce during 
downturns. 
• Temporary employment, where permitted, may be - from the perspective 
of the firm - a functional equivalent. In a temporary employment strategy 
5 	 There are other important flexibility options that transcend the domain of personnel policy 
that is our focus here. For example, outsourcing and other forms of subcontracting and, in 
the goods producing sector, order backlogs and stockpiling. 
4 
firms achieve flexibility through segmentation in the internal labour market. 
Although a core labour force may enjoy a high degree of security in 
employment, the burden of economic contingencies is borne by fixed-term 
and other temporary employees. 
IV. Industrial relations. The functioning short-time work programmes is 
embedded in national systems of industrial relations, and the strength of trade 
unions and works councils at the enterprise level appears to be a strong factor 
promoting short-time work and other "soft" adjustment strategies. In addition to 
the out-of-pocket costs of termination, the less tangible human resources costs 
of a policy of "hiring and firing" (e.g. demotivation, alienation, even industrial 
conflict) are a major consideration in firms' personnel policies. These costs are 
presumably higher in firms with strong employee representation. 
V. Firm characteristics. Although we are primarily focusing here on macro-
level economic and institutional variables, it is obvious that diverse 
characteristics of enterprises play an important role in use of short-time work 
(LefOvre, Beraud, Sidhoum 1994). For example, employers have a greater 
interest in using short-time in the case of more skilled workers; smaller firms 
appear to rely more heavily on external mobility and have as a rule higher 
levels of turnover, itself an alternative form of adjustment. 
Incentives for short-time work 
Employers 
• The impact of the above elements of the national institutional framework can be 
interpreted as an incentive structure for employers to utilize (or not to utilize) 
short-time work. This incentive structure for employers can be summarized 
under five headings: 
• termination costs; 
• (re)hiring costs; 
• employee relations costs; 
• short-time subsidy; 
• availability of other flexibility options. 
The importance of these depends on the nature of the adjustment situation and 
in particular whether a temporary or structural decline in the workforce is 
anticipated (Figure 2). 
5 
Employees 
Whereas for employers short-time work is primarily important as a form of 
labour force flexibility, especially in the face of temporary declines in labour 
demand, for employees it is primarily an instrument for enhancing job security, 
albeit with loss of income. The most important incentives for employees would 
appear to be the short-time benefit level, which determines the costs of short-
time for them, and the likelihood of resuming normal working time. Thus, short-
time work is most attractive to employees during temporary adjustment 
situations, because the costs to them are low, but may not be worth the "price" 
for many employees if future employment prospects are uncertain or if short-
time work is merely a prelude to unemployment. 6 
The most fundamental effect of short-time work for employees as a group 
is that - for a given reduction in the volume of labour inputs - it shifts the burden 
of adjustment from a narrower to a wider group, e.g. instead of making 10% of 
the workers in a firm's workforce redundant, the working time of all is reduced 
by 10%. Since it is usually younger and less senior employees who have the 
highest risk of being selected for redundancy (due to seniority, social criteria), 
a strategy of work sharing affects the interests of individual workers differently 
and presupposes a significant degree of solidarity among the workforce. 
Figure 2. Factors affecting firms' incentives for short-time work in different 
adjustment situations 
Type of costs 
Adjustment Situation 
temporary structural 
restructuring closure 
Termination costs + + + 
 
Hiring costs 
 
Short-time subsidy + + + + + + 
(if available) 
+ + + 
(if available) 
Flexibility options 
(temp. employment, flex. working 
time) 
- - - ... ... 
Employee relations costs 
	 . 
_ 
+ + + + + + +.. 
Notes: I emporary (none = firm facing temporary or cyclical adjustment situation; Structural = 
either "restructuring" in which the firm survives but with a major reduction in its workforce or 
"closure' in which the firm ceases to exist or substantially all jobs are lost. Symbols: "+" = 
positive; ".° = indifferent; "-" = negative. 
A related consideration is whether short-time benefits reduce an individual's subsequent 
entitlement to unemployment benefits. 
6 
In situations of structural adjustment in which all or part of the workforce will 
eventually be made redundant short-time work may be criticized for failure to 
clearly signal employees concerning their employment prospects. For 
employees who will eventually lose their jobs, the alarm signal is diffuse and 
may encourage false expectations; moreover, the firm runs the risk of losing 
employees it would prefer to retain and hence of losing control of the labour 
shedding process with possible negative effects for its survival chances. 
2. Programme Characteristics 
There is considerable institutional variety in short-time work programmes in the 
four countries examined. How do these programmes differ with respect to the 
incentives they provide for short-time work? 
The goals of the short-time work schemes in the four countries examined 
are broadly similar to stabilize employment and to avoid or minimize dismissals 
during temporary economic downturns through reductions in working time and 
to assist firms in economic difficulty (Figure 3). Moreover, short-time work is 
also used in all four countries as an instrument for coping with structural 
change in firms and industries experiencing large scale redundancies, although 
this development is very recent in France. 7 There are, however, major 
differences with regard to the level and duration of benefits and the share of 
costs borne by employers. 
Level and duration of benefits 
Both the level and duration of short-time benefits are greatest in Italy where 
workers on short-time receive 80% of their previous gross earnings and, in the 
case of the CIG-S, short-time compensation may last up to four years. 8 
Employees on short-time in Spain receive a degressive benefit for a maximum 
period of two years. Employees receive 70% of previous earnings for the first 
180 days and 60% thereafter" In Germany benefits are only slightly lower at 
67% (60% without children) of previous net earnings and may normally last up 
to a maximum of two years. In France benefit payments are normally only 50% 
of previous earnings, and the maximum duration is 700 hours (about nine 
months at 50% of normal working time). Even under the new TRILD programme 
7 While the French and German programs exclude seasonal adjustment, this situation is 
also covered by the CIG-0 in Italy. 
• 	 . %, 	 Subject to a monthly ceiling that is currently equivalent to ca. 2/3 of average earnings in 
industry. Thus, even workers with average earnings may not• receive an 80% wage-
replacement rate if they are working zero hours. 
9 Subject to a monthly ceiling equal to 220% of the national minimum wage. 
7 
(Long-term short-time compoensation: see Figure 3), the maximum duration is 
relatively short. 
From the perspective of employers and labour costs the Italian programme 
is the most generous. Employers are as a rule only required to bear 8% of the 
costs of short-time work in the CIG-0 and 4.5% in the CIG-S (the latter rate 
doubles after 2 years) and pay no social security contributions for short time. 
By contrast the German scheme is surprisingly expensive for employers. 
Recent changes require German employers to bear not only the employer's 
share of social contributions for short time but also those of the employee." 
Moreover, collective 
public benefit level 
employer. 11 
Thus, while an Italian employer bears only ca. 3-5% of normal labour costs 
for employees on short-time, it is 26% to 40% in Germany. Employers' costs 
are lowest in Spain because all costs for short time are assumed by the 
unemployment insurance system and there is no experience rating. 12 
10 
 In Germany employers are required to bear the full costs of social security contributions 
for pension insurance (19.2% in 1994) and health insurance (ca. 12 -15%, depending on 
the insurance fund) or a total of ca. 26% of normal labour costs (wages plus statutory 
charges). This cost shift took place in two steps. Until 1990 the German labour market 
authority reimbursed employers for the full costs of social security contributions for 
employees on shod-time. Initially, the reimbursement of the employers share of 
contributions to social security was abolished in 1990, and then, as of 1994, the 
reimbursement for the employees' share of contributions too. 
11 
 For example, in the Hamburg area agreement (7/23/91) for the metal working and 
electronics industry (I(3 Metal) required employers to top up short-time compensation by 
paying an additional 50% of the foregone earnings. In the Stuttgart region (5.5.90) 
employers are required to top up short-time compensation to 80% of gross earnings if the 
reduction in working time exceeds 10%. The VW collective agreement requires that short-
time pay be topped up to 90% of wages for periods on short-time. We have the 
impression that many such provisions were dropped or made a local option (Kann-
Bestimmung) in the most recent round of agreements negotiated during the recession. No 
systematic data are available on how widespread such provisions are in German 
collective agreements. The high estimate of 40% of normal labour costs assumes that the 
employer must top up short-time benefits to 90% of net wages for a worker with an 
average wage in the metal working industry and without children. 
12 
 Supplements based on collective agreements appear to be rare or non-existent 
agreements in some sectors frequently require that the 
be topped up to 70-90% of normal wages by the 
8 
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The French case is more complicated because of two interesting features: the 
requirement of a minimum hourly payment for short-time compensation and a 
public subsidy for employees on short-time that is a fixed hourly sum rather 
than proportional to wages. 13 We estimate that a French employer must 
ordinarily bear about 9% of the usual labour costs for an unskilled worker and 
14% for a skilled worker on short-time (more for higher paid employees; see 
Figure 4). 14 Although unattractive to employees, chOmage partiel in France is a 
financially more attractive option for employers than in Germany and 
comparable to the costs of the CIG in Italy, even though short-time work is only 
possible for a more limited period in France. 
From the point of view of employees, the Italian programme is the most 
generous (80%), followed closely by that in Spain (70 - 60 %) and Germany 
(min. 67 to 60%). Short-time work in France is decidedly less attractive for 
employees, who as a rule receive only 50% of their normal wages. This pattern 
is reinforced by the relative levels of unemployment benefit for redundant 
workers: In France unemployment benefit is considerably more generous (70%) 
that short-time compensation, whereas in Italy regular unemployment benefits 
are extremely low (30%) and until 1991 special benefits for those who become 
- unemployed as a result of collective redundancies were only 66% of previous 
earnings for a maximum of six months . 15 Since 1991 these benefits have been 
significantly increased for employees who lose their jobs in the course of mass 
dismissals German and Spanish workers receive the same benefit for short 
time as for unemployment 
13 Ch8mage partiel in France is financed jointly by the state and the affected enterprises. In 
addition to the 50% compensation rate for short-time noted above, there is also a flat rate 
minimum hourly benefit (29F as of July 1994), which is fixed as a percentage of the social 
minimum wage (SMIC). This means that law paid workers may actually receive more than 
a 50% of previous wages. Moreover, the state subsidy (allocation specifique; AS) is itself 
a flat rate that is set periodically as a percentage of this minimum hourly payment. The 
employer is obligated to pay at least the minimum hourly compensation of currently 29F 
for short time and subsequently receives a partial reimbursement of 22F from the state. 
Since all employees are entitled to at least 50% of their previous earnings, the employer 
must pay the difference between the flat rate of 29F and 50% of previous eamings for 
higher paid workers (allocation conventionel; AC). 
14 Assuming that direct wages are 70% of total compensation. Under certain circumstances 
additional state subsidies may be available to reimburse employers 50% to 100 of their 
share of the costs of ch8mage partiel. This requires the conclusion of a special a 
agreement between the employer and the Fond National de l'Emploi (F.N.E.). 
15 The CIG is in part a substitute for the lack of an adequate general system of 
unemployment insurance. 
11 
Figure 4. Short-time benefit, state subsidy, and employers' costs per hour by 
wage level (FF) in France, 1993 
Hourly wage Benefit Level State flat-rate 
payment 
Employers' 
costs 
Minimum Wage 34,83 2917 22 7 
Worker" 
Skilled Worker 60,00 30 22 8 
Technician 1 76,00 38 22 16 
Technician 2 100,00 50 22 28 
Manager 2 120,00 60 22 38 
Social Security Ceiling 150,00 75 22 53 
Manager" 170,00 85 22 63 
Source: Liasons Sociales, v. 82/93, August 13, 1993. 
Thus, the French worker is likely to prefer unemployment to extended short-
time work, whereas Italian workers (or their representatives) have a strong 
incentive to prefer short-time work. For German and Spanish workers short-
time and unemployment benefits are the same. Only in Spain do periods on 
short-time reduce the duration of unemployment benefit entitlements; in all 
other countries short-time work, in effect, prolongs entitlement to benefits, even 
if it culminates in unemployment. 
3. Trends in Short-time work 
Trends 
National differences in the type of programme data collected make it difficult to 
compare levels of short-time work. In France official data are published on the 
annual total number of authorized days on short time. 19 In Italy data are 
available only for the total annual number of authorized hours, and in Germany 
only on the average annual number of participants. In Spain, the data are even 
more complicated: Temporary lay-offs are documented in authorized days and 
reductions in working time in authorized hours. 
16 SMIC as of 1.7.93 
17 
 Minimum hourly benefit. 
18 Special subsidies may be granted to firms in economic difficulty to avoid dismissals for 
economic reasons. 
19 
 Data are apparently collected on in terms of authorized hours of short-time work and 
converted into days by dividing total hours by the number of hours in the statutory working 
day (i.e. statutory weekly working time divided by 5). 
12 
Although unsuitable for comparing levels of short-time work, national data 
are useful for describing trends. Figure 5 reports national programme data on 
annual total hours or participants standardized to control for changes in 
dependent employment (per employee or per one hundred employees). While 
there has been a strong upward trend in short-time work since 1970 in both 
Italy and France, no trend is evident for West Germany, where short time 
peaked in 1975. It was the heavy reliance on short-time work as a social shock 
absorber in East Germany that pushed short-time work to unprecedented levels 
in Germany (see Figure 6, below). The Spanish data show what appears to be 
an underlying downward trend, although the time series is too short to draw any 
firm conclusions. This trend is consistent with the liberalization of temporary 
employment since 1984 
The rising trends in short-time work in France, Germany, and Italy as well 
as the apparent declining trend in Spain are overlaid by more or less strong 
cyclical patterns. Although differences in the available national programme 
data on short-time work make precise comparison difficult, changes in short- 
time work in France, Italy, Spain and, especially, West Germany are highly 
responsive to changes in industrial production. 
3.1 Comparing levels of short-time work 
Given the limited comparability of national programme data, we use a second 
best strategy of estimating full-time equivalent persons working short-time on 
the basis of national programme data. This allows us to compare the order of 
magnitude of short-time work and its labour market impact. 
The estimates were constructed as follows: For Germany national data on 
the average annual number of participants are converted to full-time 
participants according to a standard formula. 20 For France national programme 
on annual number of days in programme is converted into annual working 
hours and divided by hours worked per year by full-time workers in industry. 21 
For Italy and Spain data on the total number of hours compensated are 
20 The percentage reduction in working time is estimated on the basis of reported data by 
broad categories. 
21 A further complication in the French case is the fact that the available data on authori-
zations do not reflect actual program uptake since employers do not actually use all short-
time subsidies applied for and authorized under the program. For purposes of comparison 
of levels of uptake of short-time work the only solution appears to be to rely on estimates 
of the percentage authorized days of short-time work actually used Actually uptake in 
recent years is estimated to be about 45-47% of uptake (Beraud, Lefevre, Sidhoum 1993). 
The existence of variation across industries and over the course of the business cycle 
complicates use of such estimates. 
13 
converted to full-time equivalents by dividing this figure by hours worked per 
year by full-time workers in industry.n 
The resulting estimates are only approximate indicators and not precise 
measures due to the complexity of the estimating procedure and differences in 
national data sources. Nevertheless, they provide a useful basis for cross-
national comparison. As we would expect, short-time work is markedly more 
important in Italy, where there were consistently above 200,000 full-time 
equivalent employees on short-time from 1980-93 (Figure 6). Spain where the 
number of full-time equivalent participants never falls below 100,000, has the 
second largest programme followed by West Germany. However, in 1990-91 
utilization of short-time work in united Germany surpassed even that in Italy 
and Spain due to the huge importance of this programme in the new German 
Lander. France has the lowest level of short-time work surpassing 50,000 only 
in the peak year of chemage partiel in 1993. 
22 
 Although the Italian data are based on authorizations we have undertaken no adjustment. 
One expert interviewed suggested that the data on the CIG-Ordinary may overestimate 
actual use by as much as one third. 
14 
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15 
If these data are adjusted for population size and industrial structure by 
expressing them as a percentage of dependent employment in industry, we find 
that the gap between Spain and Italy and the other two countries widens. 
Short-time work in Spain never falls below 2% of dependent employment in 
industry and surpassed 6% at its peak in 1984 (Figure 7). Italy shows a 
similarly high level of use of short-time work followed by West Germany and, at 
an even lower level ! France, where short-time work never rises above 1% of 
dependent employment in industry. 
3.2 Explaining national differences in utilization 
How can these clear national patterns and differences in the incidence of short-
time work be explained? Clearly fluctuations in economic output and hence the 
demand for labour are a principal determinant of uptake of short-time work. 
This is evident in the more or less strong cyclical pattern in the programme 
data (and for the surge in short-time work in East Germany) in all countries. 
However, national differences in the amplitude of fluctuations in economic 
activity over the business cycle are too small to explain these consistent 
national differences in the level of uptake of short-time work. 
The programme, regulatory and institutional factors discussed above 
clearly explain the high level of use in Italy, in particular, the generosity of the 
short-time subsidy and the stringency of employment protection. 23 Moreover, 
other flexibility options in the working time regime and in the use of fixed-term 
contracts are severely restricted (see Figure 8). In contrast to Germany, where 
reductions in weekly working time has been accompanied by a marked 
increase in working time flexibility, the working time regime in Italy, like that in 
France and Spain, remains relatively rigid. In particular overtime remains 
strictly regulated, and collective agreements are as a rule even stricter than the 
legal limits (Goldin 1995). 
23 
 Employment protection appears stronger in Italy than in any other EU state. Moreover, 
Italy is the only country to have actually strengthened employment protection in the last 
decade by extension of unfair dismissal regulations to previously exempt small firms. 
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Figure 6: Annual Total of Full-time equivalents in France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain 
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Figure 7: Full-time equivalents as percentage of all dependent 
employment in industry 
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The high level of uptake of short-time work in Spain is somewhat puzzling. 
Although we would expect the generosity of its short-time work programme and 
the stringency of employment protection in Spain to generate a higher level of 
uptake than in Germany or France, it is surprising that uptake is as high as in 
Italy. Although employment protection is also stringent in Spain, where it is 
even applicable to the smaller firms, 24 the maximum duration of short-time 
benefits is shorter and the wage-replacement rate somewhat lower than in Italy. 
Moreover, although the working time regime in Spain is inflexible (as in 
Italy), 26 Spain has developed an extraordinarily high level of fixed-term 
employment since the mid-1980s, which we would expect to function as a 
functional equivalent, reducing the need for short-time work in adjustment 
situations (Schomann, Rogowski, Kruppe 1995). 26 
An examination of the composition of short-time in Spain shows that the 
Spanish programme is predominantly a temporary layoff scheme in which the 
employment relationship is suspended. Only a small fraction of total 
compensated hours is attributable to reduced hours (see Figure 10). While 
layoffs (i.e., short-time work at zero hours) also occur in France and West 
Germany and are very frequent in Italy, this form of 'short-time' is most frequent 
in Spain. Apparently the Spanish programme functions primarily as a temporary 
layoff scheme in which affected workers are compensated through the 
unemployment insurance system but remain pro forma employees of the firm. 
Unfortunately, we have no information on the percentage of Spanish workers 
on layoff who eventually resume their normal working time. 
24 
 The impact of institutional feature is reflected in the fact that use of short-time work is 
apparently relatively higher in smaller firms in Spain (although the available data are not 
strictly comparable; see Figure 10 below). 
25 
 Spanish reforms adopted in 1994 now provide for a great deal of flexibility based on 
collective agreements. 
26 
 In the manufacturing sector, in which short-time work is concentrated, only 2.9% of all 
employees in Italy were on fixed-term contracts, whereas 28.5% were employed on such 
°atypical" contracts in Spain in 1991 but only 8.5 and 7.1% in France and Germany 
respectively. In 1994 new restrictions were placed on temporary employment. 
18 
Figure 8. Schematic assessment of institutional factors influencing short-time 
work in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain 
INFLUENCES 
FRANCE GERMANY ITALY SPAIN 
Short-time scheme 
-benefit level low middle high middle 
-wage cost relief high low high high 
-duration low middle high middle 
Employment protection middle middle high high 
Flexibility options 
-temporary employment middle middle low high 
-working time 	 flexibility low high low low 
The higher rate of utilization of short-time work as an adjustment strategy in 
Germany in comparison with France reflects the German scheme's more 
generous compensation to employees• and, above all, the fact that it is 
potentially available for a significantly longer period, although the employers 
labour cost saving for employees on short-time is greater in France. 27 There is 
by contrast little difference between the two countries with regard to 
employment protection as French regulations are on a par with thoie in 
Germany, although not as restrictive as in Italy or Spain (Mosley 1994). 28 
Figure 9: Fixed-term employment and short time in industry 
Spain,1990 
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time work by industry from Anuario de Estadisticas Laborales. 
27 This is to a large extent a reflections of the lower wage-replacement rate for employees in 
France. 
28 Prior to the abolition of prior administrative approval for redundancies in the mid-1980s, 
French regulations were arguably even more restrictive than in Germany. 
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Two other factors speak strongly for a higher German preference for internal 
adjustment through short-time work: First, the decidedly stronger position of 
employee representatives at the enterprise level in Germany, especially the 
strength of the works councils; second, the much greater reliance on temporary 
employment as a flexibility option in France. Ad hoc accompanying measures 
are much more important in France in situations of structural adjustment, but 
this public leverage has not been used to promote greater reliance by firms on 
short-time work during structural adjustment. In fact, the French case suggests 
that such accompanying measures may constitute an alternative to short-time 
worta 
Figure 10: Short-time and temporary lay-offs by firm size, 
Spain, 1988 
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3.3 Labour market impact 
Because a primary goal of short-time work programmes is to maintain 
employment and avoid unemployment, their labour market impact is a principal 
concern in evaluation research. Moreover, estimates of the labour market 
effects of short-time work programmes are useful in assessing the cost 
effectiveness of short time work programmes in comparison with other labour 
market instruments. The estimates made by national labour market authorities 
are, however, only approximations given the limitations of the available data 
29 
 For example, early retirement for labour market reasons. 
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and the assumptions that have to be made. This section discusses estimates of 
the labour market impact of short-time work programmes. 
Since the actual reduction in weekly working time for workers on short-time 
may vary from a couple of hours to a total lay-off, the initial problem is to 
estimate the level of short-time work in terms of full-time equivalents. How this 
is done depends on the national programme data available. For example, 
German programme data reports the number of participants and their 
percentage reduction in normal working time only in four broad categories (10- 
25%, 26-50%, 51%-75%, 76%-100%) and the total number of hours spent in 
the programme can only be estimated on the basis of a weighted average of 
these categories. The number of full-time equivalent participants in the 
programme is then calculated on the basis of statistics on annual working time 
adjusted to take into consideration absence from work due to sickness and 
annual leave. The German estimating procedure (Flechsenhar 1979) 
understates programme impact by using average working time rather than 
weighting working time by the incidence of short-time work, which is 
concentrated in industries in which working time is generally lower. 
The resulting full-time equivalent figure is regarded as an estimate of the 
employment effect, i.e. the number of positions saved through the programme. 
For example, the total number of participants in the programme during 1993 
was 767,000 persons and the estimated full-time equivalent employment effect 
was 228,000 The estimated full-time equivalent employment effect for France, 
Germany, Italy, and Spain is reported in Figures 6 & 7, above 
This procedure, however, overestimates the actual incremental 
employment effects of the programme sifice it fails to take into consideration 
windfall effects. Enterprises hoard labour routinely during cyclical downturns 
(Bosworth and Westaway 1991) and short-time work programmes provide an 
additional incentive for a course of action that firms might in any case pursue. 
For example, in Canada it has been estimated that ca. 7% of compensated 
short-time in Canada would not have resulted in layoffs even without the 
programme (Graves and Dumas 1993). 30 We are not aware of other reliable 
estimates of windfall effects. 31 In order to minimize windfall effects programmes 
may impose special threshold conditions, for example, in Germany the 
30 The principal reasons based on the experience of the comparison group are: 1)Resort to 
privately financed work sharing; 2)Iabour hoarding in firm's interest; 3)unexpected 
improvement in the economic situation. 
31 On the basis of a regression analysis of firm-level unemployment insurance claims 
Kerachsky at al. (1986) estimated lay-off conversion ratios" for three US states with short-
time programs. The results were, however, erratic yawing from .01 to .95: In interviews, 
20% of user firms stated that they would not have resorted to layoffs even in the absence 
of the short-time program. However, because of the small size of the short-time program 
in the United States and the special features of the institutional setting, generalization 
from this experience seems unwarranted. 
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reduction in hours must be at least 10% of normal working time and affect at 
least one third of all employees, for at least 4 weeks. Among the national 
programmes examined, there are also threshold conditions in Spain but not in 
France and Italy. 
Finally, in estimating the incremental impact of the programme on 
unemployment, labour supply effects must be discounted. In the official 
German estimates the reduction in the number of unemployed is considerably 
lower than the employment effect since the IAB assumes that, in the absence of 
short-time work, about 113 of the loss in employment would be absorbed by 
withdrawals from the labour force. Thus in 1993 the estimated impact of short-
time work on unemployment was only about 152,000 persons (Flechsenhar 
1979; Bach, Kohler, Spitznagel 1986). While it is necessary to estimate the 
percentage of workers who would otherwise withdraw from the labour force, the 
actual statistical assumption used in Germany (113) appears to be merely a rule 
of thumb. Interestingly, the IAB initially assumed that all persons on short-time 
in East Germany would have otherwise become unemployed. Clearly the 
labour supply effect of this (and other) labour market programmes has to be 
estimated in each national labour market. 
For the reasons discussed, the actual incremental impact of short-time 
work on unemployment will be less than the full-time equivalent program 
participation reported in Figures 6 & 7. Figure 11 reports estimates for France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain assuming a one-third offsetting labour supply effect 
and a 5% windfall effect. Thus, the chart should be interpreted to mean that the 
number of full-time equivalent unemployed persons would be greater by the 
indicated percentage of dependent employment in industry. The labour market 
impact of short-time work is presented as a percentage of industry employment 
because the use of the programme and, therefore, the reduction in 
unemployment, is heavily concentrated in this sector. The labour market impact 
is particularly large in Italy and Spain and, in recession years in Germany. 
Since only a minority of the workforce is employed in industry, the impact on 
the total labour force is correspondingly smaller in all countries. These 
estimates are merely indicative of the order of magnitude of the reduction in 
unemployment through these programmes and should be interpreted with 
caution. 
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Figure 11: Estimated labour market impact of short-time work 
programmes in France, Germany, Italy and Spain 
34 Industry distribution and selectivity 
This section compares national patterns in the structure of participation in 
short-time compensation. As a rule, short-time work regulations do not formally 
exclude specific sectors (except for the GIG-S in Italy; see Figure 3), small 
firms (except for the Italian CIG since 1991), or certain categories of workers 
(except for the exclusion of white-collar workers from the GIG-0 in Italy until 
1991).32 
Sectors 
The distribution of short-time work is remarkably similar in all four countries. 
Short-time work is overwhelmingly concentrated in the industrial sector (Figure 
32 An important implication of the minimum benefit and the flat rate subsidy in France is that 
both the wage-replacement benefit and the state's contribution to financing chemage 
partiel decline with increasing skill levels and wages (see Figure 4). This means that the 
state subsidy is greater for personnel least likely to be retained by the employer (i.e., lower 
paid and lower skilled workers). Although an interesting program feature, the actual 
difference in costs to the employer is too small to affect personnel practices (see above). 
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12).33 Whereas all sectors of industry have a high incidence of short-time 
work,34 short-time work is hardly used in the service sector. 36 There a 
significant use of short-time work in the service sector only in Spain in 
"transport and communication" and in "distributive trade, hotel, catering" in 
France and Spain. 
Why is short-time work almost exclusively an adjustment strategy for the 
industrial sector? Differences in short-time regulations are not the explanation. 
Although the CIG-S for structural short-time in Italy explicitly gives priority to 
the industrial sector, the actual pattern is no different from that in countries 
without such a restriction. Labour market regulations are also not an 
explanation since they are with few exceptions common to all sectors. One 
likely explanation is the strongly cyclical economic pattern in industry: 
adjustment situations are a regular occurrence in the industrial sector and 
short-time work appears to have been widely accepted as a routine response. 
Although firms encounter economic difficulty or undergo structural change 
in the service sector as well, they are apparently able to rely more on other 
adjustment strategies such as natural attrition, atypical employment, and early 
retirement in adjustment situations. There are not only different adjustment 
needs but apparently a different adjustment style in goods producing industries. 
Utilization of short-time work may also relate to different management 
styles with different types of workers. It is pre-eminently an instrument for 
managing adjustment in the blue-collar workforce segment and not for white-
collar workers. Thus, in Italy - the only country for which such data are 
available - over 90% are blue-collar workers even in the CIG-S, which has 
been in principal open to white-collar workers for many years. Moreover, since 
1991 white-collar workers are also eligible for the CIG-0, nevertheless 
utilization for this category of workers remains low (ca. 10% of all participants 
in 1993).36 Apparently the regulations themselves are only a minor factor in 
explaining this pattern of use. The fact that short-time work is an instrument 
predominantly for adjusting the blue-collar workforce - even within the industrial 
33 
 The index of the relative incidence is computed simply by dividing the proportion of short-
time work in a sector by that sectors share of dependent employment for each year a 
value of 1 indicates that the percentage of all short-time wort in a sector is identical with 
its share of employment. Figure 12 reports an average of these annual values for the 
1983-1991 period. 
34 
 The extremely high rate of use of short-time work in the German construction sector may 
be misleading. Since all four countries have special programs for the construction sector, 
the cross-national differences reported here may merely reflect differences in the area of 
application of special construction and general short-time work schemes in each country. 
35 
 There is an interesting partial exception in distribution and personal services in France 
where the incidence of short-time work is below average but significant. 
36 
 The pattern of use of short-time work for white collar workers in Italy shows a heavy 
concentration in the industrial sector little different from that for blue collar workers. 
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sector (see Figure 13 below) - is also a partial explanation for its low level of 
utilization in the service sector. 
Fig. 12: Index use of short-time working in (West-)Germany, 
France, Italy and Spain 1983-91 
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Establishment size 
In all four countries larger firms are much more likely to use short-time work as 
an adjustment strategy than are smaller firms. In France all establishments with 
more than 500 employees accounted for 38% of authorized days of short-time 
work but only 12.6% of total employment in 1991, whereas establishments with 
less than 50 employees accounted for 53% of all employment but only 22% of 
authorized days of short-time work (Lefevre, Maud, Sidhoum 1994). 37 Data 
for the Italian metal working industry show a similar pattern OECD heavier use 
in larger firms (Figure 13). In Spain too the incidence of short-time work is 
greatest in larger firms. Although firms with over 500 employees account for 
37 Comparable data for 1981 indicates that this has been a consistent pattern of uptake. 
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„ only about 28% of dependent employment in industry, they account for about 
45% of all authorized hours in the Spanish short-time programme (see Figure 
10), Interestingly, this bias in the direction of larger firms is most pronounced 
for shorter working hours than for temporary layoffs. Apparently temporary 
layoffs are a form of short-time work that is more compatible with the 
circumstances of smaller enterprises. Not entirely comparable data from a 
West German survey in the mid-1980s show that short-time work was ca. 50% 
more frequent firms with over 100 employees in industry than in smaller 
establishments. These data are merely indicative; no precise comparison of the 
relationship between firm size and use of short-time work in the four countries 
is possible given the limitations of available data. 38 
Figure 13: Authorized hours of short-time work per employee 
in Italy by establishment size and status, 1991 
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Again eligibility rules for the respective national short-time work schemes 
apparently play only a small role. Although it is possible to exclude small firms 
as in Italy (since 1991), the same general pattern is evident in all countries 
even though there is to our knowledge no such formal restriction in France or 
Germany.39 
38 The French data refers to the whole economy, while the German data refer to industry and 
the Italian data to only one sector, and the Spanish data to industry. . Since, as noted 
above, short-time work is extremely rare in the service sector, the most appropriate 
comparison would before the incidence of short-time work by firm size in industry 
separately. 
39 
 It is difficult to judge whether informal practices discriminate against smaller firms 
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For organizational as well as cultural reasons smaller firms rely more 
heavily on external mobility. This is implicitly recognized even in labour market 
regulations. Although most regulations are equally applicable to small firms 
there is an important exception: Employment protection regulations are more 
stringent for larger firms. For example, regulations pertaining to the existence 
of a works council (Germany, France), the requirements for social plans 
(France, Germany), special procedures for collective redundancies (France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain) or coverage of unfair dismissal legislation (Germany, 
Italy) have firm-size thresholds. Moreover, in practice labour representation 
tends to be weaker with decreasing firm size. 40 
4. Short-time Compensation as an Instrument for Structural 
Adjustment 
Initially introduced as a flanking measure for firms experiencing temporary 
difficulties, short-time work programmes are increasingly used as an instrument 
for assisting firms and their employees in coping with structural change. The 
case for short-time work is, however, much less clear cut in enterprises or 
industries undergoing structural change in which a large portion of the 
workforce will eventually be made redundant. From the employers perspective 
there is, under these circumstances, little incentive to hoard even skilled labour 
and termination costs must be incurred in any case. Moreover, extended short-
time work may entail significant opportunity costs for firms by prolonging the 
restructuring process. For employees who will eventually lose their jobs the 
lack of a clear signal may encourage false hopes and hence retard individual 
reorientation and reintegration in new employment. Moreover, the firm runs the 
risk of losing employees it intends to retain, and hence of losing control of the 
labour shedding process, because they may seek alternative employment due 
to fear of job loss, with possible negative effects for the firm's survival chances. 
This section addresses a number of questions related to the use of short-
time compensation in structural adjustment: 
• To what extent are national programmes available for intervention in 
structural rather than cyclical adjustment? 
• How important is structural use of short-time work in the countries 
examined? 
40 In Germany the requirement that short-time work be approved by the works council may 
be a partial explanation for the lower level of utilization: In the absence of a works council 
(which is disproportionately the case in smaller firms) each individual worker must agree 
to the change in his or her employment contract. 
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• How have short-time work programmes been adapted to the new task of 
structural intervention, for example, by improving linkages to training and 
other active programmes? 
• What policy lessons can be drawn from European experience with short-time 
work in structural adjustment? 
4.1 Structural Regulations 
To what extent are short-time programmes focused on structural rather than 
cyclical adjustment situations? Since the inception of the CIG-S in the late 
1960s, Italy has had an explicit programme for structural short-time work (see 
Figure 3, above). At least since the 1970s Germany has also used short-time 
work as a structural instrument, if initially on an ad hoc basis. Until the recent 
introduction of the TRILD programme in 1994, ch6mage partiel in France has 
been the least receptive to using short-time work in situations of longer-term 
structural adjustment. Although there is no special regulation for structural 
intervention in Spain, the regular programme has been used flexibly in 
structural adjustment. This section briefly describes the special regulations for 
structural intervention in Italy, France, and Germany. 
The Italian employment system is traditionally highly regulated and 
protective of existing employment relationships, especially in industry. In this 
context special GIG-S benefits were introduced in 1968 and rapidly expanded 
in the following years. In contrast to the Cassa integrazione ordinaria (CIG-0), 
the GIG-S has the specific task of providing assistance to in case of structural 
crises in a company, sector or regional that adversely affect the employment 
and earnings of employees. The GIG-S differs from the regular short-time work 
programme primarily in the duration of benefits, which may last up to four 
years. 
Accompanying measures in labour market policy in France are well 
developed but heavily oriented toward external mobility. In this context short-
time work, especially structural intervention, is relatively little developed in 
comparison with the other countries examined. Only recently was a special 
regulation for structural .intervention, Temps reduit indemnise de longue duree 
(TRILD), adopted in December 1993. The new programme clearly represents 
an increased emphasis on short-time work as a policy instrument for assisting 
firms undergoing a prolonged restructuring. TRILD is conceived as an 
alternative to and not a prolongation of the regular chemage partiel scheme, 
although the subsequent conclusion of a TRILD agreement in firms with a 
recent history of chemage partiel is not per se prohibited. The principal 
difference between TRILD and the regular chemage partiel programme is that 
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the maximum duration of benefits in the new programme is considerably 
longer.41 
Short-time work in Germany traditionally aims at offsetting a short-term, 
cyclical decline in production. However, the extension of the period for short-
time benefits beyond the "normal" maximum of six months has been a regular 
practice during recessions Beginning in 1974 short-time work regulations were 
modified to permit the Minister of Labour to extend the maximum duration of 
short-time work from twelve to twenty-four months if warranted by special 
labour market conditions. 42 
Special regulations were introduced in 1983184 and in 1987 for the steel 
industry, permitting short-time work benefits for up to 36 months. In 1988 a 
change in regulations made it possible for the first time to apply for short-time 
compensation even if it was uncertain whether the employment relationship 
would be continued after the period on short time (La, structural short-time 
work).43, Originally limited to the coal and steel industry, this regulation was 
later extended to other industries. 44 Its explicit goal is to avoid mass dismissals 
that must be notified in advance under the law on unfair dismissal. After the 
dissolution of the GDR, eligibility for structural short-time work was extended to 
all companies in the five new Lander. Extensive use was made of this 
regulation and short-time work quickly became the most important labour 
market policy instrument in the East German region. 45 
4.2 The Extent of structural intervention 
The extent to which national short-time programmes are used for structural 
intervention is difficult to assess precisely. One indicator of de facto structural 
use is the duration of short-time work Separate administrative data for 
programmes for structural intervention in Italy, Germany and - since 1994 - in 
41 Twelve hundred hours per employee over 18 months in contrast to seven hundred hours 
in one year in the regular ch8mage partiel scheme. Since TRILD is intended to avoid 
impending redundancies in situations of restructuring, It is administered by the Fond 
national de l'Emploi (F.N.E.) and requires the conclusion of a special agreement with the 
state. 
42 Either in generally or for particular industries or firms. This regulation has been applied 
differently in different regions and there has never has been a clear definition of 
"extraordinary circumstances? 
43 §83 par. 4 AFG. 
44 Originally scheduled to expire December 31, 1995, but now it has been extended until the 
end 01 1997. 
43 In order to react to the sudden changes in the former GDR in 1989, a special regulation of 
$63 para. 5 AFG was introduced in 1990 until the end of 1991, which basically entitled all 
branches of economy to structural short-time work. 
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France - provide another source of information. The latter data, however, 
clearly underestimate the actual extent of structural intervention because the 
regular programmes for temporary intervention are in practice frequently used 
to accompany structural change. 
This dilemma is clearest in the case of Germany, for which both types of 
data are available for recent years. Official programme data show that 
structural short-time work under the special regulation (AFG §63 Para. 4) 
accounts for only a small fraction of total short-time work in West Germany 
(never more than 6.8% of all participants in 1993), although structural short 
time is higher in certain industries such as steel and coal as well as in the East 
German region. 
On the other hand, data on the actual duration of short-time work in West 
Germany (Figure 14), suggest that structural use is (a) much broader than that 
reported under the explicit regulation for this purpose and (b) is a long-
established practice that predates the new regulation. Thus, the duration of 
short-time work since 1976 in West Germany shows a pronounced cyclical 
pattern but no apparent trend (Figurel 4). Depending on the year, the 
percentage of German short-time workers having been on short time for more 
than six months vary between 10% and 38% of all persons on short time. 
Nevertheless, short-time work in Germany remains today, as in the past, 
primarily a programme for cyclical adjustment situations; only the expansion of 
short time in East Germany represents a really new dimension in the use of 
short-time work for structural intervention. 
Our analysis of the Spanish case shows clearly that temporary lay-offs, i.e., 
short time at zero hours, accounts for most short-time work and is even more 
frequent than in East Germany. Moreover, the average duration of temporary 
layoffs is long, for example, over 100 working days per participant in 1988 (i.e., 
ca. six months). This pattern of utilization is indicative of a relatively heavy use 
of the programme as an instrument for structural adjustment. 46 
48 By comparison the average duration of all spells of short-time work in Germany in 1988 
was only ca. 4 months. 
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Fiore 14: Short-time Work in West Germany 1979-1993 
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Although there is no programme data available on the duration of short-time 
work in Italy and France, participants in the CIG-S, the special Italian 
programme for structural intervention, accounted for about two thirds of total 
CIG hours during much of the decade of the 1980s, falling to slightly more than 
half in the early 1990s (Figure 15). Utilization of the CIG reached its high point 
during the industrial crisis of the early 1980s in which more than one million job 
ware lost During this period the number of hours compensated through the 
CIG reached a peak of 8% of total hours in the industrial sector in 1984. The 
CIG, thus, played a principal role in buffering the impact of restructuring and 
the labour market crisis (Tronti 1993). 
Although firms undergoing restructuring in France do benefit form chOrnage 
partied, which can be used in the context of social plans, the French programme 
has not been expanded as an instrument for long-term structural intervention 
as is the case in Germany, Italy and Spain. This focus on shorkerm adjustment 
situations is reinforced by the all relatively low wage-replacement rate (50% of 
previous wages) and the relatively short maximum duration of the benefits 
available (currently 700 hours). As noted above, a special short-time work 
programme has been recently introduced in France, "Long-term Short-time 
Compensation;" WILD), which is specifically aimed at situations of structural 
adjustment, although the wage-replacement rate remains unchanged and the 
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potential maximum duration of benefits limited in comparison with that in the 
other countries examined. TRILD is, however, too new to assess its impact. 
Figure 15: Cyclical (CIG 0) and structural (GIG S) short-time 
compensation in Italy, 1970-1992 
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Source: INPS and own calculations. 
4.3 Adapting programmes to structural use 
ITALY 
The heavy reliance on the GIG as an instrument of adjustment, especially 
short-time at zero hours in the CIG-S, came under increasing criticism in the 
late 1980s. It was criticized in particular for carrying job security to the point of 
preserving purely fictitious jobs without any economic sense and for being a 
source of labour market rigidity. Moreover, the CIG was regarded by many as a 
form of "Balkanization" of social benefits. While relatively privileged workers in 
industry enjoyed a high degree of job security, most Italian workers lacked even 
minimal unemployment benefits.47 Finally, the rapid expansion of the GIG 
programme led to a great deal of administrative discretion - even arbitrariness - 
in the granting of benefits and blurred of the distinction between the "ordinary" 
and the "extraordinary" or structural form of intervention. 
47 
 This criticism is not wrong but fails to recognize the real cause, which is not the GIG but 
the lack of a general system of unemployment insurance. If unemployment benefits reach 
an adequate level, the utilization of the CIG-S will decline. A new legislation in 1991 and 
1993 is a step in the right direction. It raised benefits to 30% (until December 31, 1994) 
and thereafter to 40% of previous earnings. 
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The 1991 legislative changes aimed at curtailing the use of the short-time 
benefit as a social buffer for redundant workers with little hope of further 
employment This was to be accomplished by limiting the duration of benefits 
(to a maximum of 2 years), shifting a greater burden of the financing of the 
programme to employers using the programme and providing, for the first time, 
clear procedures for making workers in the CIG redundant. The intention of the 
reform was to return the CIG to its classical functions as a programme for 
workers in firms experiencing temporary difficulties and away from providing 
income maintenance in situations of prolonged structural decline. 
Redundant workers are now entitled to a "mobility benefit equal to 80% of 
their previous earnings for a maximum period of 12 to 48 months, depending on 
age and region.45 Previously, workers who lost their job due to collective 
dismissals were entitled to benefits for a maximum of only six months Workers 
made redundant through the new mobility procedure enjoy recall rights if their 
former employer hires new staff. Moreover, they are placed on special 
"mobility" lists in the public employment service from which companies with 
more than ten employees are required to recruit 12% of their staff. 45 In effect 
external mobility is facilitated by providing special accompanying measures for 
displaced workers as well as adequate income maintenance benefits 
Moreover, firms are now required in principle to use the CIG-S on a 
rotating basis instead of the widespread practice of putting part of the 
workforce on zero hours for an indefinite period. Rotation conflicts with 
prevailing practice of using structural short-time work as an instrument of de 
facto exclusion of redundant workers rather than to support work sharing, 
which the rotation principle presupposes. 50 Although the actual frequency of 
the practice of rotation is unknown, we had the impression from our own expert 
interviews that most firms have successfully resisted this requirement, 
preferring to pay the financial penalty for not doing so. 51 
48 The maximum duration of benefits are as follows: 12 months for workers under 40 years 
of age; 24 months for those over 40 years of age, 36 months for those over 50 years of 
age. These limits are increased by 12 months in the South (Mezzogiorno). 
49 The Pacray* placement lists also Include the long-term unemployed. As an additional 
incentive, employers who hire workers displaced via this procedure on fixed-term 
contracts receive a wage subsidy in the form of a rebate of social security contributions 
and a subsidy equal to 50% of the displaced worker's remaining "mobility benefit" if hired 
on an unlimited contract. 
50 Another feature of the 1991 reform is that it provides an incentive for employers to assist 
dismissed workers to find alternative employment. Companies can reduce the level of 
the redundancy payment they make to INPS if they are successful in placing redundant 
workers assigned to the mobility rolls in alternative employment (Liso 1992). 
51 Firms not practising rotation must pay a penalty: Twice the normal contribution (i.e. 9% 
instead of 4.5%) on the amount paid out to their employees under the program. 
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Short-time and Training 
Participation in training activities while receiving short-time benefits is permitted 
in both the CIG-0 and the CIG-S, and workers in the CIG-S can in principle 
lose their benefit entitlement if they refuse an offer of training. Public further 
training programmes are, however, little developed in Italy -with the exception 
of some regions - and the possibility of using publicly supported periods on 
short time for internal training is seldom used in small and middle-sized firms. 
There are, however, many examples of larger enterprises using periods in 
the CIG for training purposes, sometimes with the assistance of the European 
Social Fund or regional governments. For example, the 1995 plan for cutting 
2000 jobs at Olivetti contains a combination of measures various measures. In 
addition to transferring 425 older employees to the CIG-S to finance the 
transition period until they become eligible for early retirement, 425 mainly 
younger employees which the company would like to retain were to receive 
benefits short-time benefits in combination with a re-training. The training 
agreement foresees, after a training period of 8 months, either recall and a new 
job at Olivetti or placement through the external labour market. The training 
program is being financed through the European commission with state and 
regional support within the framework of target 4 of the ESF and Article 9 of law 
N. 263193 (Goldin 1995). 
Alternatives 
Solidarity contracts (Contratti di solidarieta), special collective agreement 
between a company and the unions reducing working time and wages to avoid 
redundancies (or to create additional employment), were given a new impetus 
by legislative changes in 1993. Previously workers reducing their working time 
received benefits for a maximum of 24 months (in the Mezzogiorno up to three 
years) at a level of 50 % of the wage for the hours lost. 52 In the past this 
programme has had a relatively low uptake largely because the conditions in 
the CIG-S were much more favourable. However, for the 1993-1995 periods 
special temporary conditions have been introduced: For firms eligible for CIG, 
employees receive 75% of wages for lost hours and firms receive 25% of value 
of wages for reduced working time. In addition, these employers can claim a 
rebate of 20 to 35% on t ocial insurance contributions, depending on the extent 
of the reduction in working time. 53 In all other firms the corresponding 
incentives are 25% for both employees and employers. These new conditions 
52 
 Special conditions in Southern Italy: Three entire years of wage compensation at a level 
of 30 % in cases of work-sharing in order to avoid dismissals or to realize new 
employment. 
53 Thirty to forty per cent in some problem regions. 
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have led to a surge in uptake and substitution of solidarity contracts for 
structural short-time work in the CIG. 54 
In contrast to the CIG-S, in which the reduction in working time is typically 
in the form of a lay-off for part of the workforce, these agreements reduce the 
working time proportionately for all affected employees. In practice the various 
forms of work sharing are mixed. For example, at Olivetti not only short-time 
benefits but also solidarity contracts are being used to avoid redundancies. 55 
GERMANY 
Experience with structural short time work as a separate programme first in 
special regulations for the coal and steel industries, then in East Germany and, 
subsequently, as a general amendment to the German short-time programme 
have led to a number of changes in design of the instrument As in Italy, the 
short-time work programme has been shaped by conflicting goals, which are by 
no means consistent Thus, recent changes have extended the duration of 
cyclical short-time work to a maximum of 24 months (the same as for structural 
short-time work!) in response to the labour market crisis, 56 while at the same 
time the cost of short-time work for employers has been increased substantially 
by requiring them to bear the costs of health and pension contributions for short 
time.57 Evidently, labour market policy considerations are being overridden by 
budgetary restraints. 
Although there is a great deal of flexibility in the German short-time work 
programme, the usual practice in Germany has been work sharing, i.e., 
distribution of the reduction in working time among a broad group of employees 
rather than laying off part of the workforce. In case of structural short-time work, 
which expressively serves the purpose of avoiding mass dismissals, 58 the 
affected employees are to be organized in independent units so that the 
remaining part of the company can continue to function normally. The role of 
the short-time unit might be, for example, to perform repair work, to have 
employees ready for work on short-term notice, or to carry out training 
measures. 
54 
 There is a cash limit of only ca. 11 million DM in 1993. 
55 
 In addition to the changes in solidarity contracts, other provisions of the 1993 law provide 
Incentives for workers within five years of eligibility for retirement to convert to part-time 
jobs (Minister° del Lavoro 1993: 229-230). 
58 
 Until June 1995 and, thereafter, declining degressively to 12 months. 
57 
 These costs, which constitute an additional ca. 15 per cent of wages since January 1995 
and 30 per cent since 1990, were previously reimbursed by the Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit. 
58 
 This automatically excludes companies with less than 20 employees. 
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Links to the former employer must be maintained but independent legal 
entities are also permissible, for example, ArbeitsfOrderbetriebe (employment 
companies) and Beschaftigung-und Qualifisierungsgesellschaften (employment 
and training companies), so long as ties continue to exist to the former 
employer. These ties may consist, for example, of an agreement to rotate 
employees between the short time unit and the company, the possibility of 
recalling workers from the unit, or the financing of vacation and holiday pay, 
which is not covered by short-time compensation. 
Innovative approaches should also be mentioned. It is possible to operate 
the short time unit as a licensed temporary employment agency or to carry out 
on-the-job training and re-orientation measures in craft businesses by loaning 
out workers from industrial companies. For example, an innovative experiment 
in Northrhein-Wesffalia allowed workers on structural short-time work at zero 
hours in the steel industry to work temporarily (up to 6 months) in craft 
enterprises (in which there was a shortage of skilled labour) in so-called 
„taster" - courses while remaining employees of their firm. Although many such 
placements were offered by craft enterprises, the steel industry employees 
showed little interest. They had good reasons for not accepting these offers: 
The costs of geographical mobility, a high wage gap between industry and craft 
sectors - after the expiration of the 6 month-subsidy, and the job guarantee 
given by the steel industry before implementing short-time work. 
The effectiveness of the specific design features for implementation of 
structural short-time work are undermined by the fact that they apply only to the 
small fraction of short-time compensation that is officially designated as being 
for structural reasons. In fact, the boundaries between cyclical and structural 
application of the programme are fluid, and the extension of the duration for 
cyclical short-time work to 24 months practically eliminated the difference 
between the two regulations. Whether short-time work is used to overcome a 
cyclical or structural problem usually can only be distinguished in hindsight. 
Short-time work and training 
Structural short-time work was originally used in the steel and mining industries 
mainly as a smooth transition to early retirement. In the East German region 
increased efforts were made to combine short time work with training, 
especially short-time with zero working hours. This use of short-time was, 
however, never obligatory for firms and participation in training at its peak 
averaged about 15% in the eastern region. Training programs were usually 
initiated by the employees and their representatives, took place in large 
corporations and targeted the external labour market (Seifert 1993 et al.: Auer 
et al. 1992) 
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The possibility of linking short-time work with training was also 
incorporated in the new regulation for structural short-time work but employers 
are not obliged to offer training. For cyclical short-time work, access to training 
measures was first made possible by decree at of the end of 1993. 
Although now permitted, several factors make it in practice difficult to 
combine training measures with short-time work in Germany: 
1) the training may not only be relevant to the company's training needs but 
must provide employees with qualifications that will increase their 
employment prospects on the external labour market 
2) Eligibility for training and training allowances are decided on an individual 
basis in Germany, and financing of training measures for affected 
employees in an enterprise as a group is not possible. 
3) It is difficult to conduct more than short-term training measures for 
employees on short time because, Si the one hand, the actual duration of 
short-time work is difficult foresee and, on the other hand, according to the 
newest regulation employees have to be available for placement on the 
external labour market after 6 months on short-time work. 59 
4) Only "necessary training" to avoid imminent unemployment is being 
subsidized and no longer training that is simply "useful". 60 Except for 
structural short-time work, training measure may not last longer than 6 
months, because it is assumed that short-time work during longer longer 
measures is only being used for training purposes (Kruppe 1995). 
Alternative measures 
German firms in economic difficulty have also negotiated cuts in working time 
outside the framework of the short time work programmes; the VW experiment 
with the four-day week being the most prominent example. VW has proved to 
be the forerunner of a new style of working time reductions in Germany. Since 
April 1994 'collective agreements in the German metal working and electrical 
equipment industries contain a provision that allows for voluntary plant-level 
agreements to preserve employment in which working time can be reduced to 
30 hours per week ("Tarifvertrage zur Beschaftigungssicherung"). Similar 
provisions were subsequently introduced in collective agreements in other 
sectors (Rosducher and Seiffert 1994). 
There are two basic variants in the local work sharing agreements 
concluded in the metal working industry: 1) reduction in working time for all 
59 
 The placement office has to be informed of name, age, profession etc. Whether this 
requirement will be important in practice is uncertain. 
69 Support for career training, e.g. for skilled workers who wish to become master craftsmen, 
has now become more or less impossible. 
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employees with an employment guarantee for the life of the agreement; 2) 
reduction in working time affecting only part of the workforce in which there is a 
partial compensation of wage losses (1% to 7% depending on reduction in 
hours) but no employment guarantee. The first option is apparently intended in 
particular for firms who have exhausted their contingent of regular short-time 
work and the second is a possible alternative to the short-time work 
programme. 
According to a survey conducted in July of 1994 there has been a strong 
response to this option with 110 enterprises accounting for 16% of all 
employees have concluded such agreements. On the assumption of an 
average reduction in working time of 10% for the 500,000 employees affected 
by such agreements, the study implies a potential impact of up to 50,000 
dismissals avoided in these firms (IRO 1994). The number of such agreements 
subsequently declined rapidly in the course of the economic upswing - as did 
the number of employees on short-time work. 
FRANCE 
While French labour market policy has devoted a large share of its resources 
to special programmes targeted on enterprises in economic difficulty, short-time 
work has played only a minor role. French accompanying measures have 
promoted above all forms of external mobility in adjustment situations, 
especially measures directed at older employees. 61 France has also developed 
a unique set of special training schemes ("mesures de conversion") designed 
not for internal redeployment but to promote external mobility and acceptance 
of restructuring. First introduced in the early 1980s to deal with crises in the 
steel and shipbuilding industries, conversion leave (cong6 de conversion) was 
subsequently extended to larger firms undergoing collective dismissals and 
finally to all other firms and even to individual redundancies (convention de 
conversion). 
In this policy environment short-time work has been used as a temporary 
measure but not to provide long-term benefits for employees in industries in 
structural decline. In 1993, in response to rising unemployment, the maximum 
duration of benefits was raised (from 500 to 700 hours) and the state subsidy 
increased for employees on short-time. Nevertheless, there is a clear drift in 
policy toward use of short-time work in situations of structural adjustment 
(Lefevre, Beraud, Lallement, 1994). This trend is exemplified by the 
introduction of the new TRILD programme for prolonged intervention, Mich 
extends the application of short-time work to situations of prolonged 
81 
 Reduction in the retirement age, diverse early retirement programs; special regulations in 
the unemployment insurance system that permit older displaced workers to receive 
benefits until they reach retirement age without the usual obligation to actively seek work. 
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restructuring. Nevertheless, French policy still rejects use of short-time work as 
an alternative to mass dismissals in enterprises undergoing structural decline. 
How does labour market policy in France respond in similar situations 
without resorting to structural short-time work? Comparison of French and 
German experience with structural adjustment in the steel industry in the 1950s 
indicates that age measures and, especially after 1984, external training were 
most important in France, whereas redundancy payments (including voluntary 
agreements) and reductions in working time were more important in Germany, 
in addition to early retirement (Auer 1989, Houseman 1992). The reductions in 
working time were the result of short-time work, Mich was available for up to 
36 months in the steel industry, but also of reductions in contractual working 
time, which was already at 36.5 hours in 1988. In Germany it was especially 
older workers who were put on structural short-time work for extended periods 
prior to becoming eligible for early retirement While this was not possible in 
France, there was a labour market measure, dispense d'activite, in which the 
older employees remain employees of their firm but do not work and get wage 
compensation payments from the state until they reach early retirement age. 
Although not part of the short-time work programme, this measure is evidently a 
close functional equivalent for short-time work at zero hours for older workers 
in Germany and Italy. 
Short-time work and training 
French companies may use periods on short-time work for training purposes. In 
addition a new programme provides for a public subsidy for training during 
phases of low capacity utilization as an alternative to use of the short-time work 
programme. 62 Prerequisite is an agreement between the company and the 
National Employment Fund (Fond national de l'Emploi; .FNE). Such agreements 
are part of the FNE's program for further training and retraining This 
regulation, which was introduced in 1991, is not a supplement to normal short-
time work but rather an alternative: Combination of benefits from regular short-
time work and the training program is not possible. 63 
One condition for the state training subsidy is that a homogenous group of 
employees (all from one department, one category of employees) must take 
part in the training measure. The company may also bring forward training 
measures already foreseen in its annual plan or conduct other training that 
conforms to FNE guidelines. 
62 
 The regulations for training programs are laid down in the Circulaire of March 8,1991 and 
were originally limited to a year. 
63 The regulations for training programs are detailed in the Circulaire of March 8,1991. 
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Training measures supported by the FNE under the programme may 
deviate from two otherwise binding regulations: a) The duration of the training 
may be less than usual minimum (50 hours for training measures, 120 hours for 
re-training); b) categories of persons may take part who are not otherwise 
eligible for FNE-subsidized training (e.g. secretarial personnel, higher 
technicians, managers, engineers). 
Even if the FNE pays part of the wages during the training, the participants 
remain employees of their firm. The wage subsidy is usually 50% and otherwise 
conforms to normal FNE guidelines. 64 The costs for the measures are as a rule 
financed by the FNE. 65 
The new program can probably be traced back to experience between 
1988 and 1989 with a local pilot programme in the textile sector. 66 Like the 
current program training was binding for those affected and replaced the 
otherwise normal short-time work routine. Management in the participating 
enterprises regarded the experiment as a relative success, although there 
were complaints in some cases that the courses offered were insufficiently 
specialized. The reaction of the employees was by contrast equivocal. On the 
one hand, many employees were motivated and actively prepared for changes 
in their working environment, which was judged positively. On the other hand, 
especially older employees wondered about the relevance of the measure. In 
addition, there was criticism that it was not possible to obtain recognized 
certificates. 
4.4 Lessons from European experience 
Short-time work programmes perform at least three principal functions for 
employees and enterprises, which correspond to three different ideal-typical 
adjustment situations: 
1. The overcoming of a temporary decline in demand for labour, typically due 
to cyclical reasons. In this situation short-time work is supposed to stabilize 
employment and enable the firm to retain skilled labour and avoid 
adjustment costs. 
2. The overcoming of a longer-term decline in demand for labour for structural 
reasons. In this case the same programme goals are applicable. After a 
64 
 See Circula ire of September 23, 1986. 
65 
 The cost of training may be paid by the FNE if there are grounds for an exception, if the 
measure to be conducted has not been scheduled in the company's annual plan, and if it 
does not claim any of the above mentioned exceptional regulations (duration, category of 
persons). 
66 
 See the report by Francoise Daulty, Se former pendant les periodes de chomage partiel, 
1992 
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period of restructuring, the rejuvenated enterprise may be able to continue 
to employ the workers who were on short time, but the outcome is 
uncertain. 
3. The "social buffering" of mass redundancies. This situation involves either 
the use of short time as an alternative to mass dismissals or the stepwise 
termination of the entire workforce and closure. In this situation short-time 
work is used as primarily as a "social shock absorber" in order to defuse 
tensions in the enterprise and the community. 
Although short-time work (function 1) has unquestionable advantages, the 
other two functions (2,3) of short-time work in structural change cannot be 
viewed uncritically. The process of structural adjustment may be retarded in 
enterprises or whole regions and the development of alternative strategies 
postponed. For employees, short-time work mainly means a temporary 
reduction in work time, whereby structural short-time work may ultimately 
culminate in dismissal. In the latter case, however, a misleading signal is sent 
to the affected personnel, which may inhibit voluntary mobility, or other 
desirable activities such as job hunting or additional training. On the other 
hand, employees who are really needed by the firm to regain competitiveness 
might leave because they interpret short-time work as a sign that their jobs are 
at risk. 
Although the trend toward structural use of short-time work is common to 
all four countries investigated, the European countries investigated have 
followed different paths.. Italian labour market policy was the first to use short-
time compensation in structural adjustment and has gone furthest in this 
direction. However, since 1991, Italy has been trying to replace structural short-
time work (3rd function) by improving the external mobility of workers to be laid 
off. This goal is supposed to be achieved by more restrictive use of structural 
short-time work, the re-regulation of collective redundancies, and by 
introducing for the first time adequate unemployment benefits. 67 
The relatively small French short-time work programme forms a sharp 
contrast to that in Italy, offering what is probably only a Suboptimal incentives 
for short time (i.e., limited duration of benefits and a low replacement rate) even 
in situations of cyclical short-time work (function 1). The new WILD programme 
for structural short-time work, which grants benefits over a longer period, 
extends the application of the programme to cover an intermediate period 
restructuring lasting up to 18 months (function 2). However, in our opinion, the 
basic features of the programme, especially the low wage-replacement rate, 
are probably inadequate for this purpose. Furthermore, the lack of a role for 
67 The drastic increase of structural short-time work in Italy in the eighties and the resulting 
abuse of the programme can be traced back mainly to the fact it was supposed to act as a 
substitute for the lack of an adequate unemployment insurance benefit. 
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employee representatives in decisions concerning short-time work means that 
their interests are likely to be underrepresented. 68 
The absence of the parachute function (function 3) in France demonstrates 
that structural use of short-time work can be dispensed with if national labour 
market policies offer functional equivalents. In the case of France, those are 
extensive, even innovative adjustment-oriented accompanying measures, 
including "dispense d'activite." As described above, the latter regulation 
replaces the widespread and questionable practice of using short-time 
compensation to finance an extended waiting period prior for employees prior 
to entering early retirement. 
In Germany, it was the labour market crisis in the East German region that 
led to the rapid expansion of structural short-time compensation as an 
alternative to mass dismissals, which had previously been practiced only in the 
coal and steel industries (function 3). Short-time work - frequently at zero 
working hours - was used in practice as a social shock absorber in the 
aftermath of the miscalculated "shock" transformation of the East German 
economy. This was an understandable quick response to an emergency 
situation but also a distortion of the short-time work programme: the exception 
became the rule. The level of short -time work in Germany (and structural use) 
even surpassed that in Italy in 1990-91 (functions 2 & 3). 
Does structural short-time work represent a justifiable form of 
intervention? 
If short-time work has been introduced for reasons which are not simply 
cyclical, the key question is, in our view, whether continued employment of 
those on short time is likely after completion of the restructuring process. If 
short-time work is used, a return to full-time employment is not always 
predictable but should at least be the goal. 
If short-time work merely means a delay before dismissing all or part of the 
workforce, then short-time work is only being utilized because the instrument is 
readily available and can be used in a flexible mariner. In such a case, short-
time work is not being utilized for its classical functions, i.e., the retention of 
human capital and the stabilization of employment. The separation of the 
affected employees from their former employer and retraining for the external 
labour market is surely the preferable solution, and we see no reason to 
finance this through short-time compensation. 
68 
 For similar reasons, Beraud, Lefevre, Lallement (1994) regard TRILD as a form of 
compulsory part-time work. 
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The advantage to enterprises of managing redundancies through use of 
short-time work is mainly that they can select affected employees more 
according to qualifications and the business needs of the firms rather than by 
the social criteria that are applicable in the case of mass dismissals. 
Furthermore, dismissals costs can be avoided as personnel can be gradually 
reduced over a longer period through natural attrition, reducing or eliminating 
the cost of severance payments or a social plan. In addition, the employer 
benefits from an immediate reduction in wage costs, which is particularly large 
for employees on short time at zero hours. If short-time compensation is used 
in situations of structural adjustment, these savings should be invested in 
active measures for the reintegration of the employees to be released. 
Moreover, if short-time work is used for structural intervention, the signals 
given by the company are important in order to minimize negative side-effects, 
For example, placing short-time workers in a "organizationally independent 
unit' as required by law in Germany appears to provide a clearer signal than is 
the case when cyclical short-time work is used for an extended period. 69 
Although the merits of a policy of excluding older employees can be 
debated, the widespread practice in Italy and in Germany of using short-time 
work at zero working hours as a transition to early retirement is, in our view, an 
extreme case of bad practice in labour market programmes. Manageable and 
effective programmes should be designed to fulfil a clearly articulated and 
limited set of goals in terms of which they can be consistently administered, 
performance monitored, programmes evaluated, and instrument design and 
programme goals continuously reassessed Short-time work as a prelude to 
early retirement represents a makeshift extension of the programme that 
violates the clear rationale of the programme and reduces policy transparency. 
Training and short-time work 
Combining short-time time work with training is an appealing strategy for using 
periods of slack work productively, especially, prolonged periods of "structural" 
short-time work. Participation in training has long been permissible in France 
and Italy for employees on short time. In Germany it was not possible to 
combine training with structural short-time work until 1990 and not until 1994 
for those receiving regular benefits. This is apparently due to the greater 
concern in Germany about enterprises using short-time work to finance their 
own training needs. This concern seems to us to be exaggerated since 
production workers on short time are not usually priority recipients of company 
training; in Italy and France the problem is rather the very low use of this 
69 Still, one cannot expect these signals to be clearly understood by the employees as some 
links to the company continue to exist, for example, the employers resort to employees in 
the short-time unit in "case of need". 
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possibility even where it is permitted. Based on French and German 
experience, there are also considerable practicable problems in planing 
courses and scheduling training for persons who are active employees. We 
think that, as part of a strategy of activating passive benefits, public policy 
shduld promote greater use of short time for training even when in the interest 
of the firm. 
Combining training with structural short-time work, i.e., as an alternative to 
mass dismissals, is beset by special problems. Enterprises are primarily 
interested in training employees they want to keep. For older employees 
structural short-time work is frequently a form of pre-early retirement and there 
is little interest in training. For less senior workers training (or other active 
measures) are indispensable, but it is difficult to see why it should take place 
on an employment status. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the affected 
workers, their employers and society would be better of if these redundant 
workers received the same benefit in the form of unemployment insurance 
payments or a redundancy payment in combination with active measures. 
Group-oriented vs. individual measures 
An important obstacle to linking prolonged or structural short-time work with 
training or job creation programmes in Germany is the fact that eligibility for 
active measures under the German Labour Promotion Act (AFG) is individually 
determined. This means that intervention in favour of a group of affected 
employees, which makes sense in situations of structural change, is not 
possible based on the AFG. Problems affecting part of or an entire workforce, 
or even whole regions, are treated as individual problems. This is especially an 
obstacle to organize training programmes: Teams which work together well 
cannot be sponsored as such, each individual has to establish their eligibility in 
order to gain access. In contrast to Germany, measures of labour market policy 
in France and Italy are much more firm-oriented. The application of various 
labour market instruments is usually negotiated simultaneously in a package 
that is tailored to the company's need. The establishment of a special fund like 
in France for structural short-time work and other related accompanying 
measures might be an alternative for Germany too. 
5. Conclusions 
The classical rationale for public short-time work programmes in Germany and 
elsewhere is that they permit employers to retain human capital, especially 
skilled workers, over the trough of business cycle, realizing significant savings 
in turnover costs and enabling the firm to expand output more rapidly when 
market conditions improve. For employees employment relationships are 
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stabilized in comparison with a temporary lay-off or (even worse) a hire and fire 
system. From the point of view of public labour market policy this type of work 
sharing prevents unemployment at little net cost to the public because, in most 
cases, the affected employees would otherwise have been entitled to 
unemployment benefits. There is, thus, a strong case for short-time work as a 
co-ordination mechanism of public labour market policy that advances both 
equity and efficiency in comparison with what would have been the outcome of 
decisions by market actors without public intervention. 
The incentive structure for utilization of short-time work is strongly related 
not only to the generosity of short-time schemes but to other elements of the 
institutional framework such as employment protection, flexibility options, and 
labour representation. Employers own incentives for short-time work based on 
turnover costs are strongest in the classical case of short-time work in 
response to temporary adjustment situations and weak in the case of structural 
short-time work. 
Analysis of estimated full-time equivalents shows the highest incidence of 
short-time work in Italy and Spain, followed by West Germany and France. This 
pattern is stable at least over the last ten years. It is the product not only of the 
relative generosity of short-time schemes but of a variety of other institutional 
factors. In terms of employers' labour cost savings during short time, the 
German scheme ranks surprisingly low. Cost shifting in the programme and 
trends in collective bargaining have greatly increased the costs of short-time 
work for employers in Germany. 
Short-time work is highly concentrated in industry and disproportionately in 
larger enterprises in all four countries. This is not importantly a result of short-
time programme characteristics and eligibility conditions but rooted in complex 
differences in markets and adjustment style. An important policy question is 
whether short-time work is a form of work sharing that can be extended, with 
appropriate programme changes, to white-collar workers and the service sector 
(or even the public sector) or whether new and different policy instruments are 
needed to spread work sharing beyond its traditional boundaries. 
The use of short-time work as an instrument for structural adjustment is 
particularly strong. in Italy and Spain but has also been widely practiced in 
Germany since the early 1970s. The economic crisis in the East German region 
pushed use of short-time in Germany ahead of Italy and Spain, at least 
temporarily. 
As long as short-time work serves as an instrument of active labour market 
policy in the sense of work sharing, i.e., actually saves jobs, it fulfils an 
important function. However, the (unproductive) preservation of a pro forma 
employment relationship with employees who are to be ultimately separated not 
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only sends out the wrong signals to individuals but represents a distortion of 
the programme: Instead of actively promoting employment through work 
sharing it is transformed into a vehicle for social exclusion, albeit with a special 
form of income maintenance. 
The goal cannot, however, be simply to prohibit use of short-time 
compensation in situations of structural adjustment but to replace it with more 
suitable measures. It is, therefore, necessary to develop alternative instruments 
of employment policy to assist employees in enterprises undergoing structural 
adjustment which are group-oriented (rather than individual measures), which 
are financed through special* funds (rather than general unemployment 
insurance contributions), and which aim at the re-integration of short-time 
workers into the labour market (rather than merely providing passive benefits). 
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